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Constitutional designers employ many strategies for securing what
they believe are fundamental rights and vital interests.' Specifying in
the constitutional text the rights and interests to be protected is a
common device. In a constitution that relies solely on enumeration
as a rights-protective strategy, whether that constitution protects
abortion rights depends on whether any provision in that constitu-
tion is best interpreted as granting women a right to terminate their
pregnancies. Enumerating the powers government officials may ex-
ercise is a second rights-protective strategy. Government may not
constitutionally ban partial-birth abortions, although no constitu-
tional provision properly interpreted protects a right to reproductive
choice, when no constitutional provision properly interpreted au-
thorizes government officials to interfere with reproductive decisions.
Structuring government institutions is a third rights-protective strat-
egy, one that does not rely primarily on enumeration or interpreta-
tion. Government officials do not ban abortion, even when at least
some reasonable persons believe constitutional provisions are best in-
terpreted as permitting legislative prohibitions, when the constitu-
tional rules for staffing the government and passing laws consistently
provide pro-choice advocates with the power necessary to prevent
hostile proposals from becoming law. Equal protection is a fourth
strategy for protecting fundamental rights. Elected officials are less
inclined to ban abortion when they may not constitutionally confine
that prohibition to certain social classes or racial groups.
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(2006) (arguing that constitutions may be designed to secure immoral privileges such as slavery
as well as moral privileges such as human rights).
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Contemporary American constitutionalists typically treat enu-
meration as the primary, often only, constitutional strategy for pro-
tecting fundamental rights. The common terminological distinction
between "enumerated" and "unenumerated" rights implies that rights
not enumerated in the constitutional text are best characterized by
virtue of what they are not, rather than as linked to alternative consti-
tutional strategies for securing fundamental freedoms. Constitu-
tional debate during the 1970s and 1980s was over whether Justices
ought to extend the same degree of protection they offered to the
liberties enumerated in the Bill of Rights and post-Civil War Amend-
ments to other fundamental freedoms not explicitly mentioned in
those texts or in other constitutional provisions. "[T]he most fun-
damental question we can ask about our fundamental law," Thomas
Grey declared in 1975, is whether when
reviewing laws for constitutionality, should our judges confine themselves
to determining whether those laws conflict with norms derived from the
written Constitution ... [o]r may they also enforce principles of liberty
and Justice when the normative content of those principles is not to be
found within the four corners of our founding document?
Enumeration presently reigns supreme in the American constitu-
tional universe. Leading progressive constitutional theorists at the
turn of the twenty-first century insist that rights formerly thought un-
enumerated are actually enumerated. "The distinction.., between
enumerated and unenumerated rights," Ronald Dworkin declares
when defending judicial solicitude for legal abortion, is "another
misunderstood semantic device."3 Dworkin and other prominent
proponents of Roe v. Wade maintain that Justices must strike down
bans on abortion only because reproductive rights are explicitly pro-
tected by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment, properly interpreted.5  Grey, who helped coin
the term "non-interpretivism," agrees with this emphasis on enumera-
tion as the foundation of constitutional rights. He now believes "[i] t
is better to treat all approaches to constitutional adjudication as con-
2 Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 703 (1975).
3 Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, in THE
BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE 381, 386 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992).
4 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5 See RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA,
AND INDIIDUAL FREEDOM 160 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1993) ("The general structure of the Bill
of Rights is such that any moral right as fundamental as the right of procreative autonomy is
very likely to have a safe home in its text."); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy
and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 382-86 (1985) (suggesting that
abortion decisions are better grounded in equal protection than due process).
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strained to the interpretation of the sources of constitutional law, and
then to argue about what those sources are and how much relative
weight they should have."6
Constitutional analysis that privileges enumeration as the primary
constitutional strategy for protecting fundamental freedoms inter-
prets the Constitution of 1787 in light of the Constitution of 1791. 7
The original Constitution, commentary that celebrates the Bill of
Rights proclaims, was largely limited to delineating the structure and
powers of the national government. That Constitution sought to cre-
ate institutions that would protect against foreign aggression, sup-
press internal rebellions, and regulate the national economy, but
omitted vital protections against abusive official behavior. The first
ten Amendments to the Constitution, on this account, guarantee that
the national government will respect certain fundamental freedoms
when securing the above constitutional ends. Contemporary peda-
gogy entrenches this distinction between the original and amended
constitutions by dividing the constitutional universe into a course on
the structure of government, which focuses exclusively on the proper
interpretation of constitutional provisions drafted in 1787, and a
course on civil rights and liberties, which focuses exclusively on the
proper interpretation of Amendments ratified in 1791, 1865, and
1868.8
This sharp separation between constitutional questions associated
with the structure of government and constitutional questions associ-
ated with fundamental freedoms distorts constitutional history and
practice. The Framers of the original Constitution failed to specify
what rights the Constitution protected because they did not believe
enumeration was an effective strategy for securing fundamental free-
doms. Vested property rights and the freedom of speech, in their
view, were better protected by well-designed governing institutions
than by paper guarantees. The more fundamental the right, the less
likely that right was enumerated in 1787. The Federalist No. 10 high-
lights "the rights of property" and worries that a "religious sect may
degenerate into a political faction."8 Nevertheless, the original Con-
stitution provides no explicit textual protections for economic liberty
6 Thomas C. Grey, The Uses of an Unuritten Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 211, 220
(1988).
7 Similarly, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is interpreted in light of Section 1.
8 See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Found.
Press, 15th ed. 2004) (relying on a sharp separation between cases dealing with the structure of
government and cases dealing with individual rights).
9 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 81, 84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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or for the freedom of conscience. Madison instead insisted that the
constitutional politics of the large republic would more securely
guarantee these rights than a pious textualism.1 l Framers who did
not fully grasp Madison's analysis in The Federalist No. I 1 nevertheless
endorsed Madison's more general commitment to institutional de-
sign as the best strategy for preventing tyranny.
12
This paper interprets the Constitution of 1791 in light of the Con-
stitution of 1787.13 The persons responsible for the original Constitu-
tion thought they had secured fundamental rights by a combination
of representation, the separation of powers, and the extended repub-
lic. The Bill of Rights, in their view, was a minor supplement to the
strategies previously employed for preventing abusive government
practices. Madison in 1789 did suggest that enumeration might pro-
vide some additional security for the freedom of speech and related
concerns. Nevertheless, his proposed amendments were less a list of
fundamental freedoms than an enumeration of those rights likely to
appease moderate Anti-federalists. That many vaguely phrased rights
lacked clear legal meaning was of little concern to their Federalist
sponsors, who trusted their cherished governing institutions to re-
solve ambiguities justly when controversies arose in the future. Madi-
son and his political allies refused to accommodate their political ri-
vals only when former Anti-federalists proposed enumerating a right
to instruct representatives, a right Madison thought destructive of the
constitutional politics he believed best secured fundamental free-
doms.
Contemporary debates over whether the United States has an un-
written constitution and over whether the judiciary (or any other in-
stitution) should protect unenumerated constitutional rights are
rooted in the ways the Framers from 1787 to 1791 juxtaposed differ-
ent strategies for protecting fundamental freedoms. The Bill of
Rights did not include a caveat stating that those amendments were a
"sop" to the Anti-federalists, 14 a minor supplement to more important
institutional protections for fundamental rights, or a somewhat ran-
dom collection of liberties spelled out for the sole benefit of persons
10 Id.
1 Larry D. Kramer, Madison's Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611, 615 (1999).
1 See infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
13 A future project may interpret Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment in light of Section
5.
14 But see CALVIN H. JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER AT THE WICKED STATES: THE MEANING OF
THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 9 (2005) (claiming that the Bill of Rights was a "sop" to the Anti-
federalists).
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unaware of how constitutions best protected rights. Persons reading
the constitutional text after 1791 might well conclude that those
rights enumerated were more central to the constitutional order than
those omitted. Marbury v. Madison,15 or rather the nineteenth-century
political movements that successfully reinvigorated the logic of Mar-
bury, further promoted enumeration and judicial power as the only
means for limiting republican government. If, as Madison claimed in
1789, "independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a
peculiar manner the guardians of those rights,"1 6 and, as a later Su-
preme Court Justice asserted, "the Constitution is what the judges say
it is," 17 then the conclusion might follow that the Constitution pro-
tected only those rights enumerated in the text, rights best protected
by the federal judiciary. Such claims were made, however, only after
Americans forgot the constitutional strategies for protecting funda-
mental rights adopted in 1787, and transformed the partisan strategy
adopted in 1789 for appeasing political opponents into the best con-
stitutional strategy for securing vital freedoms in the present.
I. THE VIEW FROM 1787
Conventional accounts of American constitutional development
regard the Bill of Rights as correcting a defective Constitution. Citi-
zens are commonly taught that the persons who drafted the original
Constitution forgot to include textual protections for fundamental
rights in their effort to secure the blessings of liberty. Exhausted by
months of "writ[ing] and rewrit[ing] sections" on "the frame of gov-
ernment," fatigued by the summer heat, and eager to return home,
the Framers' "impatience outweighed their judgment""' when every
state delegation rejected George Mason's proposal that the Constitu-
tion be "prefaced with a Bill of Rights."' 9 Subsequent rationalizations
that a bill of rights was not necessary in a government of enumerated
20
powers were clearly inadequate. As numerous Anti-federalists
15 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
16 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 457 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
17 1 MERLOJ. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 204 (Macmillan Co. 1951).
18 Robert A. Rutland, Framing and Ratifying the First Ten Amendments, in THE FRAMING AND
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 305, 305 (Leonard W. Levy & Dennis J. Mahoney eds.,
1987).
19 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 587 (Max Farrand ed., Yale
Univ. Press 1966) [hereinafter RECORDS].
20 See 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE
STATES: RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: PENNSYLVANIA 167-68 (Merrill
Jensen ed., State Historical Soc. of Wis. 1976) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY] ("[T]he
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pointed out, the powers enumerated in Article I could easily be in-
terpreted as granting the federal government unlimited authority.
"The clause which vests the power to pass all laws which are proper
and necessary, to carry the powers given into execution," Brutus
complained, "leaves the legislature at liberty, to do every thing, which
in their judgment is best.,2' The Bill of Rights supposedly cured the
original Constitution's failure to provide adequate textual protections
for basic rights by providing legal guarantees that national officials
could not violate fundamental freedoms when pursuing legitimate
constitutional ends.
The better view is that the Framers in 1787 were committed to
protecting fundamental freedoms, but did not believe enumeration
was the best constitutional strategy for securing cherished individual
rights. Identifying tyranny with class or partial legislation,22 Federal-
ists designed governing institutions they believed would enable the
best men to gain public office and provide those distinguished repre-
sentatives with incentives to secure the public welfare. Madison and
his political allies were convinced that government abuses and major-
ity tyranny would most likely be prevented by processes for staffing
the government that privileged the selection of particularly wise and
virtuous candidates, and by processes for making laws that privileged
policies aimed at the common good rather than the benefit of par-
ticular classes or individuals. The large republic, The Federalist No. 10
proclaimed, would yield a leadership class "whose wisdom may best
discern the true interest of their country and whose patriotism and
love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial
considerations., 23  The Federalist No. 51 explained why the constitu-
tional separation of powers would enable "the private interest of every
individual" to be "a sentinel over the public rights."24 Structural con-
siderations trumped parchment barriers in 1787. If governing insti-
tutions were designed correctly, the Framers believed, enumerating
congressional authority is to be collected, not from tacit implication, but from the positive grant
expressed in the instrument of union. Hence it is evident... everything which is not given, is
reserved....").
21 Essays of Brutus, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 421 (HerbertJ. Storing ed., Univ. of
Chic. Press 1981).
22 See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LoCHNER-
ERA POLICE POWERSJURISPRUDENCE 27 (1993) ("[M]any at the time of the founding considered
the exercise of public power illegitimate precisely to the extent that it was designed merely to
advance the special interests of particular classes .... ").
23 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 9, at 82.
24 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 9, at 322.
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individual rights was unnecessary. If governing institutions were de-
signed poorly, enumerating individual rights was useless.
A. Protecting Rights in 1 781
5
The persons responsible for drafting the Constitution of 1787
were far more concerned with constitutional politics than constitu-
tional law. They sought government institutions that privileged cer-
tain outcomes and were less interested in formulating textual defini-
tions of government powers and individual rights. Madison famously
proposed "republican remed[ies] for the diseases most incident to
republican government."2 6 The original Constitution did not include
a bill of rights because Madison and other prominent Framers
doubted the efficacy of legal limitations on government power. On
matters as diverse as religious freedom and slavery, the Framers con-
sistently sought to establish a political, process that would secure cer-
tain fundamental rights and interests, scorning the enumeration
strategy they would later adopt in 1791.
Federalists in 1787 regarded legal restrictions on federal power as
dangerous, inappropriate and useless. In their view, "a written decla-
ration of rights" was "unnecessary in theory and ineffectual in prac-
tice." 7 Madison thought the adoption of a federal bill of rights was
"an irrelevant antidote to the real dangers that republican politics
would generate. 28  Government officials committed to the public
good sometimes faced irresistible pressures to ignore textual limits on
their powers. "It is in vain," The Federalist No. 41 asserted, "to oppose
constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation. 29 Past ex-
perience demonstrated that clear constitutional guidelines did not
restrain officials bent on unconstitutional usurpations. Roger
Sherman informed New Englanders that "[n] o bill of rights ever yet
bound the supreme power longer than the honeymoon of a new mar-
25 Most of this section is a lightly edited version of MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE
PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 96-100 (2006).
26 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 9, at 84.
27 FRIENDS OF THE CONSTITUTION: WRITINGS OF THE "OTHER" FEDERALISTS 1787-1788, at
161 (Colleen A. Sheehan & Gary L. McDowell ed., 1998) [hereinafter FRIENDS OF THE
CONSTITUTION].
28 JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 334 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1996).
29 THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison), supra note 9, at 257; see THE FEDERALIST NO. 25
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 9, at 160, 167 ("[H]ow unequal parchment provisions are to
a struggle with necessity.").
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nied couple, unless the rulers were interested in preserving the rights.""
The Federalist No. 48 commented, "a mere demarcation on parchment
of the constitutional departments is not a sufficient guard against
those encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all
the powers of government in the same hand."" Rights could not be
defined in ways that adequately identified government oppression.
"What signifies a declaration that 'the liberty of the press shall be in-
violably preserved?"' Hamilton asked.3 2  "What is the liberty of the
press? Who can give it any definition which would not leave the ut-
most latitude for evasion? 3 3  Parchment declarations could also be
rescinded. "Neither would a general declaration of rights be any se-
curity," Civic Rusticus wrote, "for the sovereign who made it could
repeal it."34
Individual rights were best protected by well-designed institutions.
"(A)ll observations founded upon the danger of usurpation," Hamil-
ton wrote, "ought to be referred to the composition and structure of
the government, not to the nature or extent of its powers.3 5 Promi-
nent proponents of ratification declared that the national govern-
ment could be vested with substantial powers because the internal
structure of that regime guaranteed that such authority would not be
abused. "[T] he delegating of power to a government in which the
people have so many checks," James Bowdoin Dalton asserted, "will
be perfectly safe, and consistent with the preservation of their liber-
ties."36 When Madison at the drafting convention emphasized the
need to "introduce the Checks... for the safety of a minority in Dan-
30 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 20, at 472; see 8 id. at 308, 438 (stating that those
who are in power can usurp authority under any constitution, regardless of the presence of a
bill of rights, which will only inform of rights, not restrain against tyranny); 9 id. at 975 (arguing
that bills of rights have never secured against danger, but have been "disregarded and vio-
lated"); 10 id. at 1333-34 (asserting that a bill of rights alone, without support from the govern-
ing body, will not automatically ensure the principles it demands).
31 THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison), supra note 9, at 313; see THE FEDERALIST No. 73
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 9, at 442 (noting "[t]he insufficiency of a mere parchment
delineation of the boundaries of each" branch of the national government).
32 THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 9, at 514.
3 Id.
34 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 20, at 334; see id. at 337 ("[Olur Bill of Rights may be
repealed.").
THE FEDERALIST NO. 31 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 9 at 196; see THE FEDERALIST
NO. 41 (James Madison), supra note 9, at 256 ("[I]n all cases where power is to be conferred,
the point first to be decided is whether such a power be necessary... as the next will be ... to
guard as effectually as possible against a perversion of the power....").
36 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at
105 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter DEBATES]; see 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
20, at 987-88 (avowing that political happiness rests with the republican government).
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ger of oppression from an unjust and interested majority," he pro-
posed such procedures as a national veto on state legislation rather
than specific limits on government power. 7 Hamilton regarded
"It]he Constitution" as "A BILL OF RIGHTS" in part because it
"specif[ied] the political privileges of the citizens in the structure and
administration of the government.
''
8
Basic republican institutions provided the most important struc-
tural protection against tyranny. Officials "dependent on the Suf-
frage of the people for their appointment to, and continuance in of-
fice," were thought "a much greater Security than a declaration of
rights, or restraining clauses upon paper. 3 9 The "security" for rights,
Hamilton bluntly stated, "whatever fine declarations may be inserted
in any constitution respecting it, must altogether depend on public
opinion, and on the general spirit of the people and of the govern-
ment." Benjamin Rush informed Pennsylvanians that "there is no
security but in a pure and adequate representation.A' George Mason
agreed that the democratic principle is the only means of securing
the rights of the people.42
When considering the processes for staffing the national govern-
ment and making laws, the Framers consistently selected those repub-
lican practices they believed would best protect fundamental free-
doms. The Constitution established relatively large election districts
and relatively long terms of office because the Framers thought these
practices would "obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to
discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of society."
43
The Senate was similarly structured to privilege the selection of "men
of integrity and abilities., 44 Such persons, because of their superior
political fiber, would tend to exercise power prudently, protect fun-
damental freedoms, respect constitutional compromises, and gener-
37 1 RECORDS, supra note 19, at 108.
38 THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 9, at 515; see Walter Berns,Judi-
cial Review and the Rights and Laws of Nature, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 49, 66 (noting the Framers' rec-
ognition that "the most efficient way to limit power was not to withhold powers.., but to organ-
ize power in a particular way").
14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 20, at 387.
40 THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 9, at 514.
41 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 20, at 433.
42 1 RECORDS, supra note 19, at 359.
43 THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison), supra note 9, at 350; see Mark A. Graber, Conflict-
ing Representations: Lani Guinier and James Madison on Electoral Systens, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 291,
299-304 (1996) (explaining that lengthy terms of office allowed officials to withstand political
pressures while making informed and reasoned decisions).
44 Essay, A Federalist, INDEP. GAZETTEER (Philadelphia), Oct. 25, 1787, reprinted in FRIENDS OF
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 27, at 41.
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ally adhere to the spirit of the Constitution. Madison thought reli-
gious freedom would be protected primarily by electoral arrange-
ments that ensured the diversity necessary to prevent any sect or
combination of sects from establishing the control over the national
legislature necessary to oppress rival sects. He famously declared:
In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great vari-
ety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a ma-
jority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principle
than those ofjustice and the general good .... "
The constitutional provisions crafted in 1787 are better conceptu-
alized as guidelines for elected officials than as poorly drafted or in-
tentionally vague legal rules to be enforced by the federal judiciary.
The Constitution of 1787 does contain some legal rules. The Ameri-
can Constitution requires congressional elections to be held every
two years and insists that war be declared only by the national legisla-
ture. These rules, however, are not the most important source of lim-
its on government powers. Rather than specify fundamental free-
doms and vital interests in advance and for all time, the Framers
designed institutions that let states, government officers, various reli-
gious sects, and other entities at any given time determine and pro-
tect their rights. Whether governing institutions are functioning as
originally designed depends on the extent to which the officers mak-
ing decisions have the requisite abilities and interests, not on the pre-
cise decisions they make. Herbert Storing's influential analysis of
framing thought aptly concluded that "the substance [of the Consti-
tution] is a design of government with powers to act and a structure
arranged to make it act wisely and responsibly. It is in that design,
not in its preamble or its epilogue," he emphasized, "that the security
of American civil and political liberties lie.,
46
B. The Rights Protected in 1787
Institutional strategies for protecting natural and civic rights were
particularly appropriate given the nature of the liberties Americans
sought to secure in 1787. Constitutional institutions were expected
to secure fundamental rights, and not simply those rights thought to
45 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 9, at 325.
46 HerbertJ. Storing, The Constitution and the Bill of Rights, in HOW DOES THE CONSTITUTION
SECURE RIGHTS? 15, 35 (Robert A. Goldwin & William A. Schambra eds., 1985); see Walter
Berns, The Constitution as Bill of Rights, in How DOES THE CONSTITUTION SECURE RIGHTS?, supra,
at 50, 51, 59-65 (explaining that limits on government power are found in constitutional ma-
jorities, single-issue politics, diversity of interests and industrialization, among other sources).
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be fundamental during the late-eighteenth century. Many funda-
mental rights were conceptualized as rights against partial or class
legislation, laws intended to benefit or enrich some persons at the
expense of others. The Framers thought official measures aimed at
the common good did not violate liberty, no matter what the con-
straint on individual action. Governing officials were even authorized
to waive the rights of their constituents when doing so was clearly in
the public interest. Characterizing rights in this way, the persons re-
sponsible for the Constitution sought to craft rules for staffing the na-
tional government and making national laws that would motivate vot-
ers and governing officials to pursue the general welfare. They
rejected fixed legal limitations on government power that might in
the future prove inconsistent with the common good.
The Framers recognized that enumeration was a poor vehicle for
securing the full panoply of fundamental rights. Listing the free-
doms considered fundamental in 1787 was impossible. "[A]n enu-
meration which is not complete is not safe," James Madison informed
the Virginia Ratification Convention, and "[s]uch an enumeration
could not be made, within any compass of time., 47 James Iredell as-
serted that it would be
dangerous to enumerate a number of rights which are not intended to be
given up; because it would be implying, in the strongest manner, that
every right not included in this exception might be impaired by the gov-
ernment without usurpation; and it would be impossible to enumerate
every one. Let any one make what collection or enumeration of rights he
pleases, I will immediately mention twenty or thirty more rights not con-
tained in it.
4 s
Present enumerations risked disparaging rights recognized by future
generations. 49 The Framers believed that their descendants might
better understand fundamental freedoms than they. "[T] he law of
nature," James Wilson declared, "though immutable in its principles,
will be progressive in its operations and effects."50 In his view, "the
law, which the divine wisdom has approved for man, will not only be
fitted, to the contemporary degree but will be calculated to produce,
in future, a still higher degree of perfection."51 Federalists worried
that textual guarantees for presently acknowledged liberties might
47 3 DEBATES, supra note 36, at 626.
48 4 id. at 167.
9 The rest of this paragraph relies heavily on Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Consti-
tution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1162-64 (1987).
50 1 THE WORKS OFJAMES WILSON 127 (James DeWitt Andrews ed., Callaghan & Co. 1896).
51 Id.
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inhibit protection for liberties acknowledged in the future. Edmund
Pendleton thought proposed bills of rights failed to anticipate that
"in the progress of things, [we may] discover some great and Impor-
tant [right], which we don't now think of.
52
Well-designed governing institutions were better means for pro-
tecting all the fundamental rights Americans recognized in 1787 and
might recognize in the future. When the federal government was
functioning as the Framers expected, governing officials would not
violate whatever fundamental rights most Americans believed they
enjoyed because all governing officials were elected by the people or
appointed by officials elected by the people. "Frequent elections of
the representatives of the people," John Dickinson stated, "are the
sovereign remedy of all grievances in a free government."5 3  These
governing officials were likely to make wise decisions when future
disputes over fundamental rights arose because they were selected by
a process thought to guarantee as distinguished a class of governing
officials as "republicanly" possible.54 When discussing the Senate,
Madison insisted that "[t]he danger in all cases of interested co-
alitions to oppress the minority" would "be guarded against," suggest-
ing that the answer lay with "the establishment of a body in the Govt.
sufficiently respectable for its wisdom & virtue, to aid on such emer-
gencies, the preponderance ofjustice by throwing its weight into that
scale."'55 As Americans gained greater knowledge of their fundamen-
tal rights, prominent Framers were confident that institutions staffed
by virtuous governing officials could be trusted to respect those newly
acknowledged liberties.
Many fundamental liberties the Framers sought to protect were
rights against legislation directed at particular persons or classes. An-
tebellum Americans did not regard laws aimed at safeguarding the
public welfare, health, safety, or morals as violating fundamental
rights. 6 In their view, government officials did not limit liberty when
they forbade actions thought to threaten harm to others or self. The
52 2 THE LETTERS AND PAPERS OF EDMUND PENDLETON: 1734-1803, at 533 (David John Mays
ed., Univ. Press of Va. 1967); see Terry Brennan, Natural Rights and the Constitution: The Original
"Original Intent," 15 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 965, 1006-07 (1992) (suggesting that the Framers
believed there were rights unknown at ratification).
53 John Dickinson, Fabius, in FRIENDS OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 27, at 57, 62.
54 See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
55 1 RECORDS, supra note 19, at 423.
56 See Howard Gillman, Preferred Freedoms: The Progressive Expansion of State Power and the Rise of
Modern Civil Liberties Jurisprudence, 47 POL. RES. Q. 623, 624 (1994) (explaining that nineteenth-
and early-twentieth-century judges allowed interferences with individual liberty that they be-
lieved would advance the general well-being).
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emphasis was on legislative ends, not on legislative means. As How-
ard Gillman perceptively notes, pre-New Deal 'jurispru-
dence.., focused on the character of the legislation rather than the im-
portance of the restricted liberty.,57 Justice Stephen Field articulated this
consensual view when asserting that "[c]lass legislation, discriminat-
ing against some and favoring others, is prohibited, but legislation
which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application, if
within the sphere of its operation it affects alike all persons similarly
situated, is not within the [Fourteenth] Amendment., 58  The Su-
preme Court in Lochner v. New York 9 articulated this consensus when
holding that states could not restrict the hours that bakers worked.
Such measures benefited employees at the expense of employers and
"involve [d] neither the safety, the morals nor the welfare of the pub-
lic. '60 Antebellum Americans similarly yoked the freedom to possess
and carry weapons to the public good. As originally understood, the
Second Amendment protected "a civic right that guaranteed that citi-
zens would be able to keep and bear those arms needed to meet their
legal obligation to participate in a well-regulated militia., 61  Such a
conception of liberty, Saul Cornell documents, was quite consistent
with any "intrusive gun regulation" thought necessary to serve the
commonwealth. 2 Committed to this distinction between public and
private purposes, Americans before the New Deal regarded laws
transferring property from one person to another as the paradig-
matic violation of a fundamental right,63 but thought government
could take property from anyone for public purposes as long as com-
pensation was paid.64 Common law in the nineteenth century permit-
ted state officials to destroy the value of private property without
57 Howard Gillman, Regime Politics, Jurisprudential Regimes, and Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA.J.
CONST. L. 107, 115 (2006). See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE
AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER-ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (Duke Univ. Press 1993), for the
seminal analysis of class legislation in pre-New Deal American constitutionalism.
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 32 (1885).
59 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
60 Id. at 57.
61 SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE ORIGINS
OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 2-3 (2006).
62 Id.
63 John V. Orth, Taking from A and Giving to B, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 337, 341-44 (1997) (re-
lying on the Calder v. Bull opinion for a natural law justification of property rights).
See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2661 (2005) ("[A] State may transfer
property from one private party to another if future 'use by the public' is the purpose of the
taking ....").
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compensation when that property in its natural state or as used was
causing harm to others.5
Well-designed governing institutions best secured this fundamen-
tal right not to be a victim of private or class legislation. What was
crucial, Federalists insisted, was that government pursue the common
good, not that government pursue the common good by means that
did not interfere with individual autonomy. The eighteenth-century
Constitution protected this notion of fundamental rights by establish-
ing government arrangements thought to provide citizens and
elected officials with incentives to promote the general welfare.66 The
Framers believed the combination of elections, large electoral dis-
tricts, and the separation of powers would maximize the probability
that all legislation had a public purpose. The Federalist No. 10 de-
clared that by "extend[ing] the sphere" of constitutional politics,
"you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a
common motive to invade the rights of other citizens."67 "[T] he gen-
ius of the whole system," The Federalist No. 57 maintained, was that
governing officials could "make no law which will not have its full op-
eration on themselves and their friends, as well as on the great mass
of the society."' If this analysis was correct, then a bill of rights was
not necessary. Government officials could benefit themselves and
their friends only by pursuing the general welfare. Should malfunc-
tioning constitutional institutions enable governing officials to enrich
themselves at the expense of others, prohibitions on paper would not
provide an adequate deterrent. The Framers saw "history" as
"prov[ing] that no formal constraints on authority or process could
contain indefinitely the power of a political leader who did not de-
pend on other political actors., 69 "The sole question," Sherman in-
See Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868) (holding the builder of a reservoir liable
for its leakage and destruction of a neighbor's coal mine); William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep.
816, 821-22 (KB. 1611) (finding the owner of a hog sty guilty of maintaining a nuisance be-
cause of the stench). This emphasis on public purpose explains why many antebellum Ameri-
cans thought constitutional practices that are presently regarded as clearly unconstitutional.
Congressional payments to missionaries, for example, were thought constitutional means of
civilizing Native Americans. As the purpose was public, the direct payments to religion were
constitutional.
66 See DAVID BRIAN ROBERTSON, THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICA'S DESTINY 108 (2005)
("Only the constitutional rules for choosing policy makers, defining their authority, and orga-
nizing the policy process" were thought to "stand between... ambitious politicians and the
pursuit of bad economic policies.").
67 THE FEDERALIST No. 10 James Madison), supra note 9, at 83.
68 THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison), supra note 9, at 352.
69 ROBERTSON, supra note 66, at 113.
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sisted, "ought to be, how are Congress formed? How far are the
members interested to preserve your rights?,
7 0
Conceptualizing tyranny as rule dedicated to private interests,
members of the framing generation believed that the people's repre-
sentatives could waive the fundamental rights of their constituents
when doing so promoted social ends. Private property rights, in par-
ticular, were subject to legislative waiver when the public welfare re-
quired all individuals to make common sacrifices. Government could
take private property by taxation, but only when given permission by
electorally accountable officials who could be trusted to exercise tax-
ing and spending powers only in the public interest. "Taxation of the
subject," Grey details, "required consent-at least in the . . . sense
that it required approval by a body in which the subject was repre-
sented.0' The people, through their elected representatives, deter-
mined what portion of their private property would be dedicated to
the public good. Daniel Dulany regarded this right of "self-taxation"
to be "an essential principle of the English constitution."72 " [ I] t is an
essential unalterable Right in nature," Samuel Adams asserted, "in-
grafted into the British Constitution, as a fundamental Law and ever
held sacred and irrevocable by the Subjects within the Realm, that
what a man has honestly acquired is absolutely his own, which he may
freely give, but cannot be taken from him without his consent.
7 3
Taxation with representation reflected a communal decision to
abandon certain claims of individual right. Taxation without repre-
sentation was theft.
Properly designed governing arrangements were better vehicles
than parchment guarantees for realizing the eighteenth-century un-
derstanding of taxation as voluntary donation. Individuals had no
right against any tax on any item in any amount. Whether a tax vio-
lated property rights depended on the nature of the institution doing
70 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 20, at 473.
71 Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 870 (1978).
Id. at 875 (quoting Daniel Dulany, Considerations on the Propriety of Imposing Taxes in the Brit-
ish Colonies, in 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 610 (B. Bailyn ed., 1965)).
73 Samuel Adams, Letter from the House of Representatives of Massachusetts to the Speak-
ers of other Houses of Representatives (Feb. 11, 1768), in 1 THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS
184, 185 (Henry Alonzo Cushman ed., 1904); see The Declarations of the Stamp Act Congress
(1765), in PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION: SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS ON THE STAMP ACT CRISIS,
1764-1766, at 62, 63 (Edmund Sears Morgan ed., 1959) ("[N]o Taxes ever have been or can be
Constitutionally imposed on ["the [p]eople of these [c]olonies"], but by their respective Legis-
lature."); RAKOVE, supra note 28, at 294 ("Of the rights that representative legislatures pro-
tected, the most important was that of a people to be taxed only with their freely given con-
sent.").
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the taxing, the nature of the tax imposed, and the purposes for which
that revenue might be used. The people's representatives could tax
whatever they pleased however much they pleased, as long as the tax
was general and the revenue directed toward public purposes. Prop-
erty rights were protected in this regime by governing institutions de-
signed to ensure that taxation burdens were fair and no more than
necessary to secure public purposes, not by paper rules limiting the
means by which the state could obtain needed revenues.
II. TOWARD ENUMERATION
The participants in the constitutional convention sought to design
institutions that would be controlled by persons capable of exercising
power wisely and respecting fundamental freedoms. With rare ex-
ceptions, debate was limited to the structure of the national govern-
ment. Once agreement was reached on the composition of the na-
tional legislature, agreement on national powers was achieved fairly
easily. "From the day when every doubt of the right of the smaller
states to an equal vote in the senate was quieted," Madison remem-
bered, "they ... exceeded all others in zeal for granting powers to the
general government. 7 4 Responsibility for the precise delineation of
federal powers was given to the aptly named "Committee on Detail."
Little debate took place after that committee chose to enumerate
specific federal powers rather than retain the Virginia Plan's proviso
that the federal government be authorized "to legislate in all
cases.., to which the States are separately incompetent." s Three
delegates aside, no one worried about the absence of a bill of rights.76
What mattered were the rules for staffing the national government
and the rules for making national laws, not legal limitations on na-
tional power.
7 4 RECORDS, supra note 19, at 322; see lid., at 255 ("Give N[ew] Jersey an equal vote, and
she will dismiss her scruples, and concur in the Nati[ona]l system."); see also RAKOVE, supra note
28, at 63-65 (discussing the reception and treatment of the New Jersey Plan); Kramer, supra
note 11, at 621-22, 643 (describing the NewJersey Plan as an attempt to force concessions from
the larger states).
75 2 REcoRDs, supra note 19, at 26; seeJohn C. Hueston, Altering the Course of the Constitutional
Convention: The Role of the Committee of Detail in Establishing the Balance of State and Federal Powers,
100 YALE L.J. 765, 779-82 (1990) (stating that the Framers' concerns with concluding the Con-
vention drove them to compromise).
76 See 2 RECORDS, supra note 19, at 587-88 (describing the Convention delegates' rejection
on September 12, 1787, of a committee to prepare a bill of rights); see also 13 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 20, at 195-99 (recording a unanimous rejection by the delegates of a
committee to prepare a Bill of Rights).
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These constitutional understandings changed between 1787 and
1791. The debate over the Bill of Rights led many leading propo-
nents of ratification to place greater emphasis than they had at the
Philadelphia Convention on enumerated powers as a legal protection
for fundamental rights. Madison and other prominent Framers also
promised amendments enumerating rights in order to assure ratifica-
tion in New York, Massachusetts and Virginia. Prominent Federalists,
however, continued to insist that fundamental freedoms were better
protected by the structure of constitutional politics than by rules of
constitutional law. The paucity of debate over the shift to enumer-
ated powers combined with the mixed motives Federalists had for
championing enumerated rights left unclear whether this increased
reliance on enumeration changed the nature of constitutional pro-
tections for fundamental rights.
A. Toward Enumerated Powers
Whether many delegates thought basic constitutional principles
were affected when the Committee on Detail provided a specific
enumeration of national powers is doubtful." The Committee on De-
tail was instructed to transform a series of resolutions into a constitu-
tion. One of those resolutions, proposed by Gunning Bedford of
Delaware, asserted that the national government should be vested
with the power "to legislate in all Cases for the general Interests of
the Union."78 Committee members were not authorized to deviate
from these sentiments. George Washington asserted that the com-
mittee was "to arrange, and draw into method & form the several
matters which had been agreed to by the Convention." 79 No debate
on the merits of enumeration took place after the Committee on De-
tail replaced the general language of Bedford's Resolution with an
enumeration of powers augmented by the Necessary and Proper
Clause,8 0 even though the Framers had previously regarded enumera-
77 Contra RANDY E. BARNETr, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 274-76 (2004) (arguing
that the delegates' comments suggest that they thought constitutional principles would indeed
be affected by the specific enumeration of powers).
78 2 RECORDS, supra note 19, at 26, 131.
79 3 id. at 65; see Hueston, supra note 75, at 768-69 (explaining the creation of the Commit-
tee of Detail and its intended purpose).
80 See JOSEPH M. LYNCH, NEGOTIATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE EARLIEST DEBATES OVER
ORIGINAL INTENT 19-20 (1999) (discussing the debate surrounding the use of the Necessary
and Proper Clause).
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tion as unnecessary. Some members of the Convention, most nota-
bly Pierce Butler of South Carolina, did hope that the broad lan-
guage of the Virginia Plan would eventually be replaced by a particu-
lar specification. s2  Nevertheless, no member of the ratifying
convention who championed federal power perceived a substantial
difference between the enumerated powers listed by the Committee
of Detail and the original proposal to vest the national government
with the authority to regulate all national concerns. Had the commit-
tee "meant to disregard the proposal to confer on Congress the
power to legislate in the general interests of the United States," Jo-
seph Lynch observes, "we should expect to read of a discontented
Bedford protesting the committee's betrayal of his handiwork, and of
a happy Butler supporting the report. That... was not the case.""'
Federalist rhetoric during the ratification debates further indi-
cates that few notables thought the Committee on Detail had altered
the original constitutional design. Proponents of ratification in 1787
and 1788 indiscriminately combined assertions that federal powers
were limited with assertions that Congress was authorized to regulate
all matters of national importance. The Federalist No. 39 insisted that
federal 'jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only."84
"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government," Publius later stated, "are few and defined., 85 Other pa-
pers scorned efforts to place legal limits on national power. The Fed-
eralist No. 31 declared that as a general rule "there ought to be no
limitation of a power destined to effect a purpose which is itself inca-
pable of limitation. 86  Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. 23
wrote that the powers "essential to the common defense ... ought to
exist without limitation, because it is impossible to foresee or to de-
fine the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the correspon-
dent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy
S See I RECORDS, supra note 19, at 53-54 (recording the nearly unanimous vote to give the
federal government unenumerated powers); 2 id. at 25-27 (recording the assent of the conven-
tion to a general grant of powers to the federal government); Hueston, supra note 75, at 767-68
(summarizing the acceptance of general grants and rejection of enumeration prior to the for-
mation of the Committee of Detail).
82 See 2 RECORDS, supra note 19, at 17 (recording Butler's dissatisfaction with the vague gen-
eral grant of powers).
83 LYNCH, supra note 80, at 20.
84 THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison), supra note 9, at 245.
95 THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison), supra note 9, at 292.
86 THE FEDERALIST No. 31 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 9, at 193.
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them. 87 Hamilton added that "[a] complete power.., to procure a
regular and adequate supply of revenue," as well as an absolute power
"to borrow as far as its necessities might require" were vital to the
Constitution. 8 Enumeration, these passages suggest, restricted the
ends the national government could constitutionally pursue, but not
the means by which the national government could pursue constitu-
tional ends.
Many Federalists during the ratification debates disparaged enu-
merated powers. "Is it, indeed, possible," Jasper Yeates challenged
the members of the Pennsylvania ratifying Convention, "to define any
power so accurately, that it shall reach the particular object for which
it was given, and yet not be liable to perversion and abuse?"89 When
Federalists spoke about federal authority, they consistently asserted
that the federal government had the power to meet all national con-
cerns. John Jay described the Constitution as forming a "national
government, competent to every national object .... 90
Few Federalists thought seriously about the legal significance of
enumerated powers because they still preferred constitutional politics
to constitutional law as the best means for restraining national offi-
cials. Proponents of ratification consistently emphasized how na-
tional electoral institutions were structured to guarantee that the vast
majority of oppressive proposals would not become the law of the
land.9' Federalism was safeguarded by government institutions de-
signed to ensure that all national decisions were made by officials de-
pendent for their offices on local governments or on a local elector-
87 THE FEDERALIST No. 23 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 9, at 153 (emphasis omitted);
see id. at 154 (stating that "there can be no limitation of that authority which is to provide for
the defense and protection of the community"); 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 20, at 417
(explaining the necessity of delegating sufficient power to the federal government); 8 id. at 395
("It is clear that wherever we give or delegate a trust to do any one act, we must lodge authority
sufficient to insure the execution of that act."); 9 id. at 999, 1011, 1016, 1134-35, 1144 (setting
out arguments for the delegation of powers to a federal government); 10 id. at 1196-97, 1396
(defending the delegation of powers to a federal government).
88 THE FEDERALIST NO. 30 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 9, at 188, 192; see THE
FEDERALIST No. 31 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 9, at 195 (explaining why revenue genera-
tion is essential to national defense); see also 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 20, at 548
(quoting Oliver Ellsworth's suggestion that a curtailed power to raise revenue would endanger
the nation in times of war).
89 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 20, at 438; see Letter from James Madison to Thomas
Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 8 id. at 97, 101-02 (explaining that the power of regulating trade is
essentially undefinable); see also 10 id. at 1501 (offering Madison's suggestion that the proposed
Constitution is "infinitely more safe" without explicit limitations on national authority).
90 17 id. at 111; see Calvin H. Johnson, The Dubious Enumerated Power Doctrine, 22 CONST.
COMMENT. 25, 47-48 (2005) (citing an early resolution of the Constitutional Convention, in-
structing the draft committees "to legislate in all Cases for the general interests of the Union").
91 See supra text accompanying notes 39-46.
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ate, not by judicial review. "The construction of the [S]enate," Tench
Coxe asserted, "affords an absolute certainty, that the states will not
lose their present share of separate powers., 92 The federal judiciary,
by comparison, was primarily responsible for ensuring that states re-
spected constitutional mandates.3 Federal Justices were authorized
to declare federal laws unconstitutional, but were expected to use
that power sparingly. Rakove observes that while the "Framers did in-
tend judicial review to apply to the realm of national legisla-
tion ..... [t]heir decisions on the structure of the national govern-
ment gave the Framers little reason to worry that Congress would
enact or the president approve constitutionally improper statutes that
the federal judiciary would feel compelled to overturn."94
The general understanding that elected officials, with the ap-
proval of their constituents, could waive legal limits on their power
when an ultra vires action was clearly in the public good, further di-
minished the practical difference between a government of enumer-
ated powers and one "competent to every national object."95 Jeffer-
son claimed such extra-constitutional authority to act in the national
interest when authorizing the Louisiana Purchase. 96 John Nicholas in
1794 informed Congress that while "he had not been able to discover
upon what authority the House" had "to grant" money to French
refugees:
[H]e had resolved to give his voice in favor of the sufferers: but, when he
returned to his constituents, he would honestly tell them that he consid-
ered himself as having exceeded his powers, and so cast himself on their
97
mercy.
The long run functioning of the constitutional system in which repre-
sentatives and executives could plausibly assert this power to trans-
gress constitutional limitations depended on the people having the
capacity to elect governing officials with the requisite combination of
Tench Coxe, A Freeman III, in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 20, at 50; see THE
FEDERALIST Nos. 45, 46 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 9 (discussing generally the balance of
power among states and the federal government).
93 SeeJack N. Rakove, The Origins ofJudicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 STAN. L. REV.
1031, 1041-50 (1997) (contending that the primary intent of the Framers in creating the fed-
eral judiciary, as exemplified by James Madison's writings, was to prevent the states from becom-
ing "independent, autonomous jurisdictions").
RAKOVE, supra note 28, at 175; see LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 73-92 (2004) (stating that the Framers thought judi-
cial review was primarily a check on state law).
95 17 DOCUMENTARYHISTORY, supra note 20, at 111.
96 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John C. Breckinridge (Aug. 12, 1803), in THOMAS
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 1136 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
97 4 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 16, at 172 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
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abilities and interests, not on the legal maintenance of well-defined
enumerated powers.
B. Enumerated Powers and Unenumerated Rights
The decision to enumerate powers did have the unexpected con-
sequence of enabling proponents of ratification to propose a more
legal supplement to the original institutional strategy for protecting
basic rights. Although no evidence suggests that the Committee on
Detail was very concerned with such matters as the freedom of speech
and religious liberty, prominent Framers, when responding to Anti-
federalist demands for a bill of rights, quickly transformed enumer-
ated powers into a vehicle for guaranteeing fundamental liberties.
Led by James Wilson, Federalists during the ratification process in-
sisted that the Constitution of 1787 protected fundamental rights by
authorizing the federal government to act only in a few defined cir-
cumstances. Enumerating powers, they insisted, made enumerating
rights unnecessary. Wilson famously claimed that "congressional au-
thority is to be collected... from the positive grant expressed in the
instrument of union."8 "[E]verything which is not given," he con-
cluded, "is reserved." Anti-federalists were wrong to insist on provi-
sions asserting a right to free speech because no constitutional provi-
sion permitted Congress to regulate expression. "If I have one
thousand acres of land, and I grant five hundred acres of it," George
Nicholas asked, "must I declare that I retain the other five hun-
dred?" ° Of course, government might impose some restrictions on
advocacy when doing so was necessary to secure such constitutional
ends as national security. Such restraints, however, did not violate
fundamental rights as fundamental rights were understood in 1787.
No one was thought to have a right to threaten national security or
otherwise to cause harm. Fundamental rights were primarily rights
against partial or class legislation."' By strictly enumerating govern-ment powers, the Framers detailed what constituted the public good
98 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 20, at 167-68.
99 Id.
100 3 DEBATES, supra note 36, at 444; see also 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 20, at 190,
384, 430, 471, 542, 570 (asserting that enumerated powers would secure unenumerated rights);
3 id. at 154, 247, 489-90, 525 (same); 8 id. at 213, 311, 369 (same); 9 id. at 661, 715, 767, 996,
1012, 1080, 1099-1100, 1135 (same); 10 id. at 1223-24, 1350, 1502 (same). But cf 10 id. at 1331
(quoting Patrick Henry's belief that the Bill of Rights would prevent later disputes over rights).
101 See supra text accompanying notes 46-56.
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and ruled out numerous illegitimate justifications for violating fun-
damental rights.
Anti-federalists rejected these claims that enumerated powers pro-
vided adequate protections for unenumerated rights. They feared
that the enumerated powers in Article I were so vaguely worded that
political actors could easily pass off rights violations as efforts to se-
cure national interests. "Who can overrule the[] pretensions" of
Congress that any particular "law is necessary and proper," "Old
Whig" asked. "No one, unless we had a bill of rights to which we
might appeal, and under which we might contend against any as-
sumption of undue power." °2 More importantly, Anti-federalists
feared that the national government was likely to be staffed by elites
prone to violate the liberties of more ordinary persons.' °0 Prominent
Anti-federalists combined calls for enumerating rights with calls for
changes in the structure of the national government that would privi-
lege the election of national officials less inclined to violate funda-
mental freedoms. "If ever there was a case for an explicit reservation
of individual rights," opponents of ratification believed, "the pro-
posed constitution provided one, with its very extensive powers, its
shadow of genuine representation, and its weak and dubious checks
on the encroachments of the few."'0 4 As concerned with the structure
of the national government as with the lack of a bill of rights, the fun-
damental Anti-federalist challenge to the Constitution was more di-
rected at the original institutional strategy for protecting fundamen-
tal freedoms than at the legal addendum jerryrigged during the
ratification process.
Madison responded to these Anti-federalist concerns by severing
their legal analysis from their more vital political analysis. He and his
political allies were more than willing, after the Constitution was rati-
fied, to enumerate some fundamental rights if that would appease
more moderate opponents of ratification. That enumeration, how-
ever, was justified only as a supplement to the more fundamental in-
stitutional protections for basic liberties. Madison was unwilling to
make any constitutional change that might affect what he believed
were the best governing arrangements for protecting rights. By con-
sciously adding some constitutional law without consciously changing
the underlying constitutional politics, Madison inadvertently laid the
102 Essays of an Old Whig, in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 21, at 25.
103 See 1 id. at 48 ("More precisely the Anti-federalists see the chief danger as the inherently
aristocratic character of any government.")
104 Id. at 69.
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ground for the contemporary distinction between enumerated and
unenumerated rights.
III. THE VIEW FROM 1791
The persons responsible for the Bill of Rights regarded enumera-
tion as a minor supplement to the institutional strategies crafted in
1787 for protecting fundamental liberties. When commenting on
Madison's proposed constitutional amendments, prominent Framers
were most likely to praise their tendency to alleviate Anti-federalist
fears without vitiating Federalist principles. This desire to pacify po-
litical opponents better explains what liberties were specified by the
Bill of Rights than do founding beliefs that the rights enumerated
were more fundamental than the rights not explicitly mentioned.
Proponents of the Bill of Rights, thinking that well-designed govern-
ing institutions best secured fundamental freedoms, expressed little
concern when confronted with claims that many enumerated rights
were too vague to have clear legal meanings. Madison and his politi-
cal allies, however, responded aggressively and decisively when for-
mer Anti-federalists proposed amendments that would alter what Fed-
eralists believed were governing arrangements particularly conducive
to protecting fundamental freedoms.
A. Why Enumerate?
James Madison in his less-than-moving speech introducing the Bill
of Rights proclaimed that enumerating rights in a constitution "was
neither improper nor altogether useless. 0 5 Enumeration might fos-
ter public support for fundamental freedoms. Constitutional provi-
sions protecting various liberties, Madison declared, "have a tendency
to impress some degree of respect for them, to establish the public
opinion in their favor, and rouse the attention of the whole commu-
nity .... 106 Local officials would find constitutional declarations of
rights useful when they sought to restrain the national power. Madi-
son stated, "such a declaration in the federal system would be en-
forced; because the State Legislatures will jealously and closely watch
the operations of this Government.. , "7 Enumerated rights would
enable the federal judiciary to protect the people's liberties. "If [in-
105 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 16, at 453.
106 Id. at 455.
107 Id. at 457.
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dividual rights provisions] are incorporated into the Constitution,"
Madison informed the First Congress, "independent tribunals of jus-
tice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of
those rights."08
Madison's proposed Bill of Rights, with the exception of several
provisions later rejected,"° was not designed to add rights to those
that the original Constitution was expected to protect. The problem
with the Constitution, he believed, was the perception that "it did not
contain effectual provisions against encroachments on particular
rights. ... ,,"o Enumeration provided that additional security. As
Madison asserted, "it is possible the abuse of the powers of the Gen-
eral Government may be guarded against in a more secure manner
that is now done... ."1' His goal was to "fortify the rights of the
people against encroachments of the Government.".. 2 A textual ban
on general warrants, for example, by plainly stating in the constitu-
tional text that such practices were not legitimate means for pursuing
constitutional ends might prevent the passage of oppressive laws that
Madison believed, under the unamended Constitution, were "neither
necessary nor proper.
B. Enumeration from the Perspective of 1787
The leading proponents of the Federal Constitution in the First
Congress wanted a bill of rights that would alleviate public anxieties
about fundamental rights while maintaining intact the constitutional
politics envisioned in 1787. Tench Coxe urged his political allies to
propose amendments that would enable them to "gain strength & re-
spectability without impairing one essential power of the constitu-
tion.""14 Other Federalists endorsed similar conciliatory and preserva-
tionist goals when urging constitutional reform. Paine Wingate
informed Timothy Pickering that proposed amendments might
"quiet the fears &jealousies of the well designing & not affect the es-
108 Id.
109 These exceptions were the proposed amendments on congressional apportionment, con-
gressional pay raises, and limitations on state power to infringe fundamental rights. Id. at 457-
58.
110 Id. at 450 (emphasis added).
Ill Id. at 449-50.
112 Id. at 459.
113 Id. at 456.
114 Letter from Tench Coxe to George Thatcher (Mar. 12, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 217-18 (Helen E. Veit
et al. eds.,Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1991) [hereinafter CREATING].
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sentials of the system....5 Benjamin Hawkins urged James Madison to
"do something by way of amendments without any material injury to
the system."" 6
Madison's proposed Bill of Rights was aimed at simultaneously
appeasing Anti-federalists and preserving Federalist institutions. His
plan, Madison told Jefferson, was to provide those "alterations most
called for by the opponents of the Government and least objection-
able to its friends."".7 Madison informed Samuel Johnston that what
would become the Bill of Rights "aims at the twofold object of remov-
ing the fears of the discontented, and of avoiding all such alterations
as would ... displease the adverse side .. ,,8 Proponents of the Bill
of Rights praised Madison for securing both goals. "[T]he great
Principles of the Constitution are preserved," Thomas Hartley as-
serted, "and the Declarations and Explanations will be acceptable to
the People."' 9
Many prominent Federalists regarded the Bill of Rights as little
more than a meaningless "sop" to their political opponents. 120 Theo-
115 Letter from Paine Wingate to Timothy Pickering (Mar. 25, 1789), in CREATING, supra note
114, at 223; see Letter from Henry Gibbs to Roger Sherman (July 16, 1789), in CREATING, supra
note 114, at 263 (endorsing amendments that "without giving umbrage to the friends of the
new plan of Government tend greatly to conciliate the minds of many of it's [sic] Opponents").
116 Letter from Benjamin Hawkins toJames Madison (June 1, 1789), in CREATING, supra note
114, at 243; see Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 29, 1789), in CREATING,
supra note 114, at 225 ("[S]ome conciliatory sacrifices will be made, in order to extinguish op-
position to the system .... ."); see also Letter from Tench Coxe to James Madison (Apr. 21, 1789),
in CREATING, supra note 114, at 230-31 (noting that a bill of rights would "remove fears"); Let-
ter from Nathan Dane to George Thatcher (May 31, 1789), in CREATING, supra note 114, at 242
("[W]ill not declaring the ights expressly and fortifying the liberties of the Country more ex-
plicitly induce confidence and there by infact add Strength to the government.... ."); Letter
from John Dawson to James Madison (june 28, 1789), in CREATING, supra note 114, at 255-56
(urging Madison to propose amendments "most of which will not materially effect the system,
but will render it more secure, and more agreeable in the eyes of those who were oppos'd to its
establishment").
117 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (May 27, 1789), in CREATING, supra note
114, at 240.
118 Letter from James Madison to Samuel Johnston (june 21, 1789), in CREATING, supra note
114, at 253; see Letter from James Madison to Tench Coxe (June 24, 1789) in CREATING, supra
note 114, at 254 ("[I]t is much to be wished that the discon[ten]ted part of our fellow Citizens
could be reconciled to the Government they have opposed, and by means as little as possible
unacceptable to those who approve the Constitution in its present form.") (alteration in origi-
nal); see also Letter from James Madison to James Madison, Sr. (july 5, 1789), in CREATING, supra
note 114, at 259 ("I hope [the subject of amendments] will end in such a recommendation as
will satisfy moderate opponents."); Letter from James Madison to Richard Peters (Aug. 19,
1789), in CREATING, supra note 114, at 281-82 ("[Amendments] will kill the opposition every
where.").
19 Letter from Thomas Hartley to Tench Coxe (Aug. 23, 1789), in CREATING, supra note 114,
at 286.
120 SeeJOHNSON, supra note 14, at 9.
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dore Sedgwick, while opposed in principle to Madison's proposed
amendments, thought their ratification politically necessary only if
the liberties enumerated were politically sterile. Congress "must
adopt [the proposed amendments] in every instance," he asserted,
"in which they will not shackle the operations of the government.
12'
George Washington approved such efforts to appease the moderate
opposition. While he concluded some amendments were "impor-
tantly necessary," many others were "necessary" only "to quiet the
fears of some respectable characters and well-meaning men.'
' 22 Simi-
lar sentiments were articulated by numerous leading actors in the
First Congress. Fisher Ames thought Madison's proposals "may do
some good towards quieting men who attend to sounds only, and may
get the mover some popularity .... ,,12 Enumeration as a strategy for
protecting fundamental rights, however, was silly. Ames believed
specifying "[t]he rights of conscience, of bearing arms" and
"[f]reedom of the press" in the constitutional text would "stimulate
the stomach as little as hasty-pudding."
2 4
Ames's political allies agreed that the proposed constitutional
amendments were largely symbolic. "[T] he addition of a little Flour-
ish & Dressing without injuring the substantial part or adding much
to its intrinsic value," Samuel Johnston wrote, "may have a happy ef-
fect in complimenting the Judgment of those who have themselves
up in Opposition to [the Constitution] .... 125 Roger Sherman ob-
served that Madison's proposals "will probaly [sic] be harmless & sat-
isfactory to those who are fond of Bills of rights .... ,12 6  Abraham
121 Letter from Theodore Sedgwick to Benjamin Lincoln (July 19, 1789), in CREATING, supra
note 114, at 263-64.
12 Letter from George Washington to James Madison (May 31, 1789), in CREATING, supra
note 114, at 242; see Letter from Fisher Ames to George R. Minot (July 23, 1789), in CREATING,
supra note 114, at 269 ("[I] t is necessary to conciliate, and I would have amendments.").
123 Letter from Fisher Ames to Thomas Dwight (June 11, 1789), in CREATING, supra note 114,
at 247.
124 Letter from Fisher Ames to George R. Minot (June 12, 1789), in CREATING, supra note
114, at 247-48; see Letter from Fisher Ames to Caleb Strong (Sept. 15, 1789), in CREATING, supra
note 114, at 297 ("Mr. Madison, in particular, thinks that [the amendments] have lost much of
their Sedative Virtue by the alteration [of the Senate] ... ."). But cf Letter from George Clymer
to Tench Coxe (june 28, 1789), in CREATING, supra note 114, at 255 ("[Madison] has given his
malades imaginaires bread pills powder of paste & neutral mixtures to keep them in play....").
125 Letter from Samuel Johnston to James Madison (July 8, 1789), in CREATING, supra note
114, at 260; see Letter from Lambert Cadwalader to George Mitchell (July 22, 1789), in
CREATING, supra note 114, at 268 ("[T]ho[ugh] of little or no Consequence [the amendments]
will calm the Turbulence of the Opposition .... ."); see also Letter from William Smith (S.C.) to
Edward Rutledge (Aug. 9, 1789), in CREATING, supra note 114, at 272 ("[Amendments] are
thought inoffensive to the federalists & may do some good on the other side.").
126 Letter from Roger Sherman to Henry Gibbs (Aug. 4, 1789), in CREATING, supra note 114,
at 271.
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Baldwin thought that Madison was trying to "tranquillize the minds of
honest opposers without injuring the system.' 27 The Bill of Rights,
Edmund Randolph concurred, was "an anodyne to the discon-
tented.'2 8  Some crucial "discontented" were political leaders in the
two states that, in the summer of 1789, had not yet ratified the new
constitutional regime. Benjamin Goodhue, when celebrating the
"probability of giving quiet by so cheap a purchase' '2 9 hoped that
meaningless amendments would "give general satisfaction and accel-
erate the adoption of the Constitution by the States of N. Carolina
and R. Island.',
0
William L. Smith, the rare Federalist member of the First Con-
gress who thought a bill of rights would provide vital constitutional
restrictions on national power, nevertheless regarded enumeration as
a secondary means for securing fundamental freedoms and was far
more concerned with gaining additional legal protections for south-
ern interests than with providing better guarantees for basic human
127 Letter from Abraham Baldwin to Joel Barlow (June 14, 1789), in CREATING, supra note
114, at 250; see Letter from George Gale to William Tilghman (June 17, 1789), in CREATING,
supra note 114, at 252 ("I trust you will think the most of [the amendments] Innocent.... ."); see
also Letter from Pierce Butler toJames Iredell (Aug. 11, 1789), in CREATING, supra note 114, at
274 ("A few milk-and-water amendments have been proposed.. . ."); Letter from William Ellery
to Benjamin Huntington (Aug. 24, 1789), in CREATING, supra note 114, at 287 ("[T]hose pro-
posed are indeed very innocent, and the admission of them might gratify the pride of some op-
posers of the New Government.... ."); Letter from Robert Morris to Richard Peters (Aug. 24,
1789), in CREATING, supra note 114, at 288 ("[T]he Senate should adopt the whole of them by
the Lump as containing neither good or Harm being perfectly innocent."); Letter from Peter
Silvester to Peter Van Schaack (July 1, 1789), in CREATING, supra note 114, at 258 ("I should like
to say something clever in favor of it so far as it does not injure the system. .. ").
128 Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (June 30, 1789), in CREATING, supra
note 114, at 256-57; see Letter from Benjamin Hawkins to James Madison (July 3, 1789), in
CREATING, supra note 114, at 258 ("If it should appear in the investigation that there are diffi-
culties greater than you seem to apprehend, I wish that the subject could be postponed 'till af-
ter the meeting of [the North Carolina ratification convention]."); see also Letter from William
Ellery to Benjamin Huntington (July 13, 1789), in CREATING, supra note 114, at 262-63 ("Take
away this false ground, and if they then stand out, they will stand,... upon nothing."); Letter
from Frederick A. Muhlenberg to Benjamin Rush (Aug. 18, 1789), in CREATING, supra note 114,
at 280-81 ("I hope it may restore Harmony & unanimity amongst our fellow Citizens....");
Letter from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (Sept. 2, 1789), in CREATING, supra note 114,
at 291 ("[Amending the Constitution] will have a good effect in quieting the minds of many
well meaning Citizens.. . ."); Letter from Richard Peters to James Madison (July 5, 1789), in
CREATING, supra note 114 at 259 ("[Y]ou know more of the Necessity of such Accommodations
than I do.").
129 Letter from Benjamin Goodhue to Michael Hodge (July 30, 1789), in CREATING, supra
note 114, at 269; see Letter from Benjamin Goodhue to Cotton Tufts (July 20, 1789), in
CREATING, supra note 114, at 264 ("I believe it will be thought to be good policy to propose such
as will not injure the constitution and which may serve to quiet the honest part of the dissatis-
fied .... ").
130 Letter from Benjamin Goodhue to Michael Hodge (Aug. 20, 1789), in CREATING, supra
note 114, at 283.
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rights. As did northern Federalists, Smith favored amendments that
would "more effectually secure private rights, without affecting the
structure of the Govt."131 Slavery was the "private right" Smith sought
to "more effectually secure." The South Carolina Federalist sup-
ported a constitutional declaration that "the enumeration of certain
rights shall not be so construed as to deny others retained by the
people" because he believed that such an amendment "will go a great
way in preventing Congress from interfering with our negroes after
20 years or prohibiting the importation of them."132 Smith's claim
that the amended Constitution provided stronger protections for
slave-holding rights was the only contemporaneous construction by a
national official in 1789 of the liberties originally thought to be better
secured by the Ninth Amendment.
The Federalist concern with appeasing their political opponents
dictated the liberties specified in the Bill of Rights. Madison repeat-
edly asserted that the proposed amendments should be limited to
those that were sufficiently uncontroversial as to guarantee passage.
The particular freedoms he proposed enumerating would "reconcile"
the "discon [ten] ted part of our fellow Citizens... to the Government
they have opposed, and by means as little as possible unacceptable to
those who approve the Constitution .... 3 3  Controversial proposals
were rejected simply because they were controversial. Madison
sought to "avoid[] all controvertible points which might endanger
the assent of 2/3 of each branch of Congs., and 3/4 of the State Leg-
islatures."1 34 Amendments submitted by state legislatures were in-
cluded where possible because "the principle [sic] design of the[]
amendments was to conciliate the minds of the people" and not to
list the most important rights of American citizens. 1 5 Madison pro-
posed enumerating the freedom of religion because that "had been
required by some of the State Conventions," not because of any virtue
inherent in enumerating that right. "Whether the words [were] nec-
essary or not, he did not mean to say. ,,"36 Madison favored an
amendment limiting federal appellate jurisdiction over state courts to
131 Letter from William L. Smith (S.C.) to Edward Rutledge (Aug. 9, 1789), in CREATING, su-
pra note 114, at 272-73.
12 Letter from William L. Smith (S.C.) to Edward Rutledge (Aug. 10, 1789), in CREATING,
supra note 114, at 273.
133 Letter from James Madison to Tench Coxe (June 24 1789), in CREATING, supra note 114,
at 254.
I% Id.
135 THE DAILY ADVERTIZER, Aug. 15, 1789, in CREATING, supra note 114, at 131 (reprinting of
a speech by Madison made on August 14, 1789).
136 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 16, at 758.
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cases worth more than one thousand dollars, even though he thought
there was "little danger that any court in the United States will admit
an appeal where the matter in dispute does not amount to a thou-
sand dollars. 13 7 Enumeration was politically valuable because "the
possibility of such an event has excited in the minds of many citizens
the greatest apprehension that persons of opulence would carry a
cause from the extremities of the Union to the Supreme
Court .... ,13s Other Federalists urged their colleagues to support
whatever liberties would conciliate former Anti-federalists, no matter
how fundamental or trivial they regarded the right in question. John
Vining tolerated the decision to insert a right of assembly in the Con-
stitution because "the thing was harmless, and, it would tend to grat-
ify the States that had proposed amendments. ... "139 Thomas Hart-
ley would "gratify" all state requests for specific constitutional
provisions, as long as the amendment "was not incompatible with the
general good ... ""o
No proponent of the Bill of Rights asserted that the rights enu-
merated by Madison's proposed amendments were more important
than the rights not enumerated. When Theodore Sedgwick sug-
gested that the right to assembly was too "trifl[ing]" to be inserted
into "a declaration of rights,"1 41 most representatives responded that
such a provision had been demanded by the states and was unlikely to
cause trouble.1 4' Few claimed the right fundamental. John Page's as-
sertion that "inserting the privilege [of assembly] in the declaration
of rights" was necessary because "such rights have been opposed"'
43
was the only recorded comment from the House debate in which a
speaker explained why enumeration might be a particularly good
means for protecting some freedoms rather than others. Madison
may have hoped that enumerating restrictions on state power to vio-
late certain fundamental rights would better secure various liberties
against local violations. That proposal, however, was defeated.
1 44
The conciliatory concerns that motivated Federalists to frame the
Bill of Rights and their underlying commitment to securing funda-
mental rights through well-designed governing institutions explains
137 Id. at 784.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 760.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 See supra text accompanying notes 129-31.
143 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 16, at 760.
1 1 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 73 (Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds., 1834).
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why the political leadership of the First Congress ignored occasional
assertions that proposed amendments lacked clear legal meanings.
Many Federalists in 1787 had opposed a bill of rights, in part, because
they insisted parchment declarations could not resolve disputes over
the scope of the rights declared. James Wilson, during the Pennsyl-
vania ratifying Convention stated, "l[t] he cases open to a jury, differed
in the different states; it was therefore impracticable, on that ground,
to have made a general rule.', 145 These concerns with vagueness and
ambiguity were repeated during the debates over the Bill of Rights
without having any visible influence on the status of the proposed
amendments. Samuel Livermore thought what became the Eighth
Amendment had "no meaning in it." "What is meant by the terms
excessive bail," he asked. "What is understood by excessive fines?"
46
Immediately after that speech, the House of Representatives ap-
proved the proposed amendment by a large margin.147 James Madi-
son confessed that the right to ajury trial remained contested despite
the Sixth Amendment. "The truth," he told Edmund Pendleton, "is
that in most of the States the practice is different and hence the ir-
reconciliable difference of ideas on the subject."4 8 This "truth" that
enumeration failed to settle ongoing legal disputes over what consti-
tuted a proper jury trial apparently did not even delay the decision to
send the proposed amendment mandating jury trials to the states.
Federalists who thought political protections fundamental and
enumeration a means of conciliating political rivals did not consider
at any length whether the particular language Madison employed
when enumerating rights encompassed particular practices. Rare
questions about the scope of proposed constitutional provisions were
1' James Wilson, Speech to the Convention State House (Oct. 10, 1787), in FRIENDS OF THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 27, at 102, 104; see Essay, A Federalist, INDEP. GAZETTEER (Oct. 25,
1787), reprinted in FRIENDS OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 27, at 41 ("[I]t is well known that
the cases which come before a jury, are not the same in all the States."); One of the Middling-
Interest, MASS. CENTINEL, Nov. 28, 1787, reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 20, at
331 ("[Tlhe convention have not said that trial byjury in civil cases is indispensable as they have
in criminal cases .... [F]or there is no one point in which the states more differ than
this .... ."); 10 id. at 1352 ("Let him put his finger on the part [in the Constitution] where [the
right to trial by jury] is abolished."); THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note
9, at 511. But cf Letter from George Washington to Marquis de Lafayette (Apr. 28, 1788) in 9
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 20, at 767 ("For example: there was not a member of the
convention ... who had the least objection to what is contended for by the Advocates for a Bill
of Rights and Tryal by Jury.") (alteration in original).
146 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 16, at 782.
147 Id. at 783.
148 Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Sept. 23, 1789), in CREATING, supra
note 114, at 297, 298.
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brushed aside without resolution. No representative responded when
Egbert Benson expressed concern that proposed constitutional pro-
tections for religious freedoms might be interpreted as requiring ex-
emptions for those with religious scruples against engaging in mili-
tary combat.1 49  "[A]n enumeration of simple, acknowledged
principles" 15 adequately served Federalist political needs. Madison
and his political allies had no political reason to resolve ongoing con-
troversies about the best application of those principles.
Contemporary efforts to uncover the original meaning of liberties
secured by the Bill of Rights are, thus, largely futile because Federal-
ists in 1789 consciously enumerated general principles whose practi-
cal applications they knew were contestable. Madison understood
that the constitutional meaning of "free exercise," "an impartial jury,"
and other matters left legally undecided in 1787 and 1791 would be
settled by "a series of [subsequent] discussions and adjudications."
15 1
Constitutional politics, not constitutional law, remained the primary
line of defense against abusive official actions. Fundamental free-
doms would be secure, Federalists thought, as long as constitutional
processes yielded governing officials who had the combination of
abilities and interests necessary to recognize the fundamental liber-
ties of their fellow citizens and to act on thatjudgment.
Prominent supporters of the Bill of Rights expressed concern with
substantive issues only when Anti-federalists proposed amendments
aimed at adjusting the constitutional politics Federalists thought
would best protect fundamental rights. Federalist willingness to ac-
commodate their political opponents came to an abrupt halt when
Thomas Tudor Tucker moved that the House of Representatives add
"to instruct their representatives" to what became the first amend-
ment. Critics of the original constitution regarded such a right as
central to a popular regime. "Instruction and representation in a re-
public," John Page declared, "appear to me to be inseparably con-
nected.' 15 3' Elbridge Gerry regarded "[i] nstruction from the people"
as "an additional check against abuses.' 54 The leading proponents of
the Bill of Rights vigorously rejected this effort to change the nature
of constitutional representation. George Clymer declared, "inde-
pendent and deliberative bod[ies]" were "essential requisites in the
149 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 16, at 779-80.
150 Id. at 766.
151 THE FEDERALIST No. 37 (James Madison), supra note 9, at 229.
152 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 16, at 761.
153 Id. at 762.
154 Id. at 764.
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Legislatures of free Governments."' Hartley regarded instructions as
a tool of faction, the greatest perceived threat to freedom in the late-
eighteenth century. "When the passions of the people are excited,"
he stated, "instructions have been resorted to and obtained, to answer
party purposes.,
156
Federalists during the debate over instructions consistently pro-
claimed that fundamental freedoms were best protected by a na-
tional, republican aristocracy. 57 Sedgwick insisted that congressmen
were "representatives of the great body of the people" of "the whole
Union." If national legislators began regarding themselves as repre-
senting a particular state or district, he stated, "the greatest security
the people have for their rights and privileges is destroyed."5 8 Other
representatives emphasized how instructions substituted parochial vi-
sions for the deliberation about the public welfare Federalists
thought essential to protecting rights. "The great end of meeting,"
Hartley asserted, "is to consult for the common good." In his view,
the more "local or partial view" that was likely to underlie instructions
"does not necessarily enable any man to comprehend it clearly.' ' 59
Sherman condemned instructions for interfering with the "duty of a
good representative to inquire what measures are most likely to pro-
mote the general welfare.' 160 These comments expressed two core
Federalist commitments: legislation aimed at the common good did
not violate fundamental rights' 6' and that the best way to secure the
common good was to develop an electoral system that enabled par-
ticularly virtuous persons to deliberate about the general welfare. 16
Instructions threatened rights, Clymer thought, because "they pre-
vent men of abilities and experience from rendering those services to
the community that are in their power.'
63
Most Anti-federalists complained bitterly that the proposed consti-
tutional amendments did not alter how they perceived the flawed
original institutional protections for fundamental rights. Gerry de-
clared that Madison's efforts would only "reconcile those who had no
155 Id. at 763.
' Id. at 761.
157 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 492
(1969) ("[A]ll of what the Federalists wanted out of the new central government seemed in the
final analysis dependent upon the prerequisite maintenance of aristocratic politics.").
158 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 16, at 771.
159 Id. at 762.
160 Id. at 764.
161 See supra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
162 See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
I6 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 16, at 763.
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adequate idea of the essential defects of the Constitution.' 64 These
defects lay in the structure of the national government and the pow-
ers vested in that government. Richard Henry Lee and William Gray-
son remained "apprehensive for Civil Liberty" because the "impracti-
cability... of carrying Representation sufficiently near to the
people... compels a resort to fear resulting from great force, and
excessive power in government.0 65 "Some valuable Rights are indeed
declared," Lee fretted, "but the powers that remain are very sufficient
to render them nugatory at pleasure."1 66 Many Anti-federalists echoed
the Federalist critique of enumeration as symbolic politics. Parch-
ment barriers were meaningless, Patrick Henry complained, "[fior
Right without her Power & Might is but a Shadow.' ' 67 Lee agreed that
"right without power to protect it, is of little avail.' ' 68 George Mason
seems to have been the only leading Anti-federalist who "received
much Satisfaction from the Amendments to the Federal Constitu-
tion.,,169 The liberties enumerated in the Bill of Rights, most oppo-
nents of ratification concluded, were "mutilated and enfeebled,"'76
"good for nothing,"' 7' and "calculated merely to amuse, or rather to
deceive.' 72
164 Letter from Elbridge Gerry to John Wendell (Sept. 14, 1789), in CREATING, supra note
114, at 294.
165 Letter from Richard Henry Lee and William Grayson to the Speaker of the Virginia House
of Delegates (Sept. 28, 1789), in CREATING, supra note 114, at 299-300; see Letter from Richard
Henry Lee to Patrick Henry (Sept. 14, 1789), in CREATING, supra note 114, at 295-96 ("[E]x-
tended representation, know[ledge ol] characters, and confidence in consequence, [are wanting
to sway the] opinion of Rulers, without which, fear the offspri[ng offorce] can alone answer.").
1 Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry (Sept. 14, 1789), in CREATING, supra note
114, at 295; see Letter from Samuel Chase to Richard Henry Lee (May 16, 1789), in CREATING,
supra note 114, at 240 ("I fear that no Check will be placed on the Exercise of any of the powers
granted."); Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Samuel Adams (Apr. 25, 1789), in CREATING, su-
pra note 114, at 233 (" [T] he safety of liberty depends not so much upon the gracious manner, as
upon the Limitation of Power.").
167 Letter from Patrick Henry to Richard Henry Lee (Aug. 28, 1789), in CREATING, supra note
114, at 289.
1 Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry (Sept. 27, 1789), in CREATING, supra note
114, at 298.
169 Letter from George Mason to Samuel Griffin (Sept. 8, 1789), in CREATING, supra note 114,
at 292.
170 Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Francis Lightfoot Lee (Sept. 13, 1789), in CREATING,
supra note 114, at 294; see Letter from Theodorick Bland Randolph to St. George Tucker (Sept.
9, 1789), in CREATING, supra note 114, at 293 ("[Iln my opinion they have not made one mate-
rial [amendment].").
171 Letter from William Grayson to Patrick Henry (Sept. 29, 1789), in CREATING, supra note
114, at 300.
172 Letter from Thomas Tudor Tucker to St. George Tucker (Oct. 2, 1789), in CREATING, su-
pra note 114, at 300.
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The Federalists who sponsored the Bill of Rights were no more
excited by enumeration. Madison complained of "the nauseous pro-
ject of amendments. ' 7 3 His political allies spoke of "this disagreeable
Business,"' 74 "the unpromising subject of amendments,"175 and "the
wearisome business of amendments."7 6 Richard Morris thought the
effort a "[w]aste of precious time. ' '11 7 Most were happy that, after
sending the proposed amendments to the states, Congress could fi-
nally return to substantive business. William Ellery expressed this
common sentiment when he asserted, "I don't think the amendments
will do any hurt, and they may do some good, and therefore I don't
consider them as of much importance."'7 " "God grant it may have the
effects which are desired," an exhausted Benjamin Goodhue stated,
"and that We may never hear any more of it ....
IV. MARBURYAND ENUMERATION TRIUMPHANT?
A. Enumerated Rights in Action
Americans would soon hear much more of the Bill of Rights, par-
ticularly when they paid more attention to legislative proposals than
to judicial decisions. Federalists and Jeffersonians at the turn of the
nineteenth century debated at great length whether the Sedition Act
of 1798 was consistent with the First Amendment and the enumer-
ated powers of the national government.8 0 James Madison during
the War of 1812 informed Joseph Story that a proposed ban on sedi-
173 Letter from James Madison to Richard Peters (Aug. 19, 1789), in CREATING, supra note
114, at 281.
174 Letter from Frederick A. Muhlenberg to Benjamin Rush (Aug. 18, 1789), in CREATING,
supra note 114, at 280.
175 Letter from Theodore Sedgwick to Pamela Sedgwick (Aug. 20, 1789), in CREATING, supra
note 114, at 283.
176 Letter from Benjamin Goodhue to the Salem Insurance Offices (Aug. 23, 1789), in
CREATING, supra note 114, at 285.
177 Letter from Robert Morris to Richard Peters (Aug. 24, 1789), in CREATING, supra note
114, at 288.
178 Letter from William Ellery to Benjamin Huntington (Sept. 8, 1789), in CREATING, supra
note 114, at 291.
179 Letter from Benjamin Goodhue to the Salem Insurance Offices (Aug. 23, 1789), in
CREATING, supra note 114, at 286.
18 See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789-
1801, at 260-62 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1997) (citing the various arguments made for and against
the constitutionality of the Act); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, THE PEOPLE'S DARLING
PRIVILEGE 52-79 (Duke Univ. Press 2000) (referring to the legislature's struggle to draft the Act
and the public debate that followed).
[Vol. 9:2
Jan. 2007] ENUMERATION AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL STRATEGIES 391
tion was unconstitutional." First Amendment protections for free-
dom of religion were invoked when presidents considered issuing
calls for a day of prayer, 82 and when Congress debated appointing
legislative chaplains. Proponents and opponents of slavery before
the Civil War debated at great length whether proposed national re-
strictions on antislavery advocacy were consistent with the First
Amendment and the enumerated powers of the national govern-
ment.18 4 Whether the first ten Amendments limited federal power in
the territories was another subject of ongoing legislative debate in an-
tebellum America.
85
Federal Justices before the Civil War were slower to invoke the in-
dividual rights enumerated in the first ten amendments to the Consti-
tution. The Marshall and Taney Courts more aggressively limited
federal power than is commonly thought.88 The Justices, when re-
straining the national government, however, tended to base decisions
on the unenumerated right not to be divested of private property
than on any specific constitutional provision. In Polk's Lessee v. Wen-
dal & Al., ChiefJustice Marshall proclaimed as one of "the great prin-
ciples of justice and law" that government could not give title to
property that the government did not own. s8 "[A] grant is absolutely
void," he asserted without pointing to any constitutional text, when
"the state has no title to the thing granted." 89 William L. Smith might
181 See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS 1801-1809, at
166 (Univ. of Chi. Press 2001) [hereinafter THEJEFFERSONIANS] (noting Madison's resistance to
pressure to suppress sedition on both political and constitutional grounds).
182 See id. at 5 (stating thatJefferson would not proclaim a day of thanksgiving in part because
the Constitution did not grant the federal government authority over religion); see also DAVID P.
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DEMOCRATS AND WHIGS 1829-1861, at 143-45 (Univ.
of Chi. Press 2005) [hereinafter DEMOCRATS AND WHIGS] (questioning the government's au-
thority under the Constitution to prescribe a day of prayer).
183 See DEMOCRATS AND WHIGS, supra note 182, at 146-48 (referencing the objections of con-
gressmen to the appointment and funding of congressional chaplains). For other antebellum
legislative debates over the constitutional meaning of religious freedom, see THE
JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 181, at 318-29.
184 See CURTIS, supra note 180, at 155-93 (discussing the First Amendment's role in the at-
tempt to suppress abolitionist literature in the South).
185 See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND
FUNDAMENTAL LAw 73-81 (1996) (examining the various theories concerning the federal gov-
ernment's power to govern new territories).
186 See Mark A. Graber, Naked Land Transfers and American Constitutional Development, 53 VAND.
L. REV. 73, 78-106 (2000) (discussing several cases in which the Supreme Court refused to allow
the government to effect naked land transfers).
187 See id. at 85 (stating that the land takings cases "raised fundamental natural law issues-
issues the justices would resolve by reference to general principles rather than by positive con-
stitutional law").
188 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 87, 99 (1815).
189 Id.
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have been pleased that the Supreme Court first invoked the Bill of
Rights as a limit on federal power when providing protections for
slavery in Dred Scott v. Sandford, although Chief Justice Roger Taney's
opinion relied on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
rather than on the Ninth Amendment.' 90
Federal Justices more frequently cited the Bill of Rights after the
Civil War. The Supreme Court at the turn of the twentieth century
occasionally invoked the Fourth and Fifth Amendments when limit-
ing national power.' 91 Numerous judicial decisions handed down af-
ter 1950 asserted that state power to violate fundamental rights was
limited by the Bill of Rights as incorporated by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 9 Fulfilling a Madisonian
hope thwarted in 1789,193 the Stone, Vinson, and Warren Courts ag-
gressively protected fundamental freedoms against hostile state ac-
tion, while rarely finding that the federal government had violatedI 194
the rights enumerated in the first ten Amendments. The Burger
and Rehnquist Courts were the first tribunals in American history
that, with some frequency, ruled that federal laws violated freedom of
expression rights enumerated by the Constitution.'95 The Supreme
Court has never held that a federal law violates either the Free Exer-
cise or Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.
190 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1856).
191 See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 389-99 (1914) (invoking the Fourth
Amendment to prevent the government from searching citizen's homes without a warrant and
using items found in the search against them); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886)
(invoking the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to prevent the government from using a person's
private papers against him); see also KEN I. KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CML LIBERTIES 29-64
(2004) (exploring the role the Fourth and Fifth Amendments played in protecting privacy).
192 See generally Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding that the federal Sixth
Amendment right to a trial by jury applies to the states); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (extending the federal right to trial counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to de-
fendants in state courts); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (incorporating the protections of
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments into state law).
193 Madison proposed an amendment requiring states to respect certain fundamental free-
doms. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 16, at 452. The Senate refused to endorse that proposal.
1 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, supra note 144, at 72 (Sept. 7, 1789).
194 See THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY 40-41 (2004) (re-
ferring to compiled data tending to show that the annual average of federal laws struck down by
the three Courts was much lower than the annual average of state laws struck down).
195 See generally Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (finding that provisions of the Communi-
cations Decency Act of 1996 violate the First Amendment); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S.
310 (1990) (holding that a federal law banning the burning of the American flag is unconstitu-
tional); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (ruling that the expenditure provisions of the Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act of 1971 violate the First Amendment).
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B. The Logic of Enumeration
The contemporary debate over unenumerated rights is more
rooted in the logic of Marbury v. Madison than in the constitutional
strategies for protecting fundamental freedoms employed by the per-
sons responsible for the original Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
The rights specified in the first ten Amendments were originally un-
derstood merely as examples of the individual liberties that the Con-
stitution would protect when governing institutions were functioning
as the Framers anticipated. Enumerated rights were no more fun-
damental constitutionally than those rights not enumerated. 196 Sev-
eral Framers asserted that enumeration facilitated judicial protection
for the specified rights, 97 but Justices before 1787 and until the Civil
War protected both enumerated and unenumerated liberties. 9 8 No
evidence exists that the proponents of the Bill of Rights sought to al-
ter this ongoing judicial practice.
John Marshall in 1803 proffered a very different conception of the
constitutional strategies for limiting government than those adopted
by the Framers. Marbury asserted that the Constitution limited gov-
ernment power primarily through written legal restrictions on legisla-
tive authority that were enforceable by a court of law. Constitutional
politics, in this revisionist account, was an oxymoron. Politics was
what legitimately took place within constitutional boundaries and not
the processes by which those boundaries were determined. Mar-
shall's Marbury opinion was the first major American state paper that
privileged enumeration as the means for securing fundamental free-
doms.
Marbury's emphasis on the "writtenness" of the Constitution and
the Constitution as fundamental law began the process by which legal
restrictions on federal power enforced by the federal judiciary be-
came understood as the primary constitutional strategy for protecting
individual rights and limiting official authority. Constitutions re-
stricted government, Marshall asserted, by enumerating specific re-
strictions on government power. "The powers of the legislature are
196 See supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
197 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 16, at 457 (explaining the importance of "independent
tribunals of justice" as guardians of the rights enumerated in the Constitution); Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMASJEFFERSON
80-81 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1895) (emphasizing the "legal check" that enumeration of
rights vests in the judiciary).
198 See Sherry, supra note 49, at 1167-76 (suggesting early court's reliance on natural law prin-
ciples).
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defined, and limited," Marbuiy declared, "and that those limits may
not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written."' 99 In this
altered constitutional universe, writing and only writing restrained
government and prevented tyranny by providing legal grounds for
courts to disregard unconstitutional laws. Written constitutional pro-
visions were "the fundamental and paramount law of the nation," °°
and it was "emphatically the province and duty of the judicial de-
partment to say what the law is."201
The only constitutional limits on national power that this textual-
ist logic recognized were those enumerated in the original Constitu-
tion and subsequent amendments. When providing examples of ap-
propriate exercises of judicial power, Marshall emphasized laws
inconsistent with such textual provisions as the declaration in Article
I, Section 9 that "no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be
passed."2 °2 At no point did Marbury suggest that the Constitution
might have been designed to protect fundamental freedoms other
than those enumerated or that the Framers may have relied on alter-
native constitutional strategies for limiting government. Constitu-
tional strategies for protecting fundamental freedoms that aban-
doned enumeration in favor of institutions structured to provide
governing officials with incentives to pursue the general welfare, Mar-
bury implied, "abolished" the "distinction... between a government
with limited and unlimited powers.
2 0 3
Marshall's claim that all provisions of the Constitution had inde-
pendent legal significance further privileged enumeration as the con-
stitutional strategy for protecting fundamental rights. Marbury holds
that the congressional power to "make exceptions" to the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court does not license the national legis-
lature to add to that tribunal's original jurisdiction. Marshall de-
fended this conclusion by claiming, "[i]t cannot be presumed that
any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect., 20 4 The
Framers would not have specifically enumerated the conditions un-
der which the Supreme Court could exercise original jurisdiction, he
maintained, if the "exceptions" clause of Article III empowered Con-
199 Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
200 Id. at 177.
201 Id.
2 Id. at 179.
203 Id. at 176.
204 Id. at 174.
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gress to alter federal jurisdiction at will.20 5 This presumption, that all
constitutional provisions are legally significant, implicitly undercuts
previous Federalist assertions that the Bill of Rights was largely de-
claratory, that the first ten Amendments are best understood as
merely enumerating examples of the rights that the original constitu-
tion was designed to secure. °6 If every constitutional provision has
"[legal] effect," and only some rights are enumerated, then the infer-
ence is near overwhelming that government officials are constitution-
ally obligated to respect only those rights enumerated in the constitu-
tional text. Had the Constitution of 1787 protected all fundamental
freedoms, there would have been no reason, by Marshall's logic, to
enumerate only some liberties in 1791.
Marbury's teachings did not immediately bear fruit. As several
commentators have noted, the decision was "born out of political de-
feat., 20 7 Judicial power to enforce the Constitution was no greater
immediately after 1803 than immediately before. At most, Marbury
preserved whatever judicial power had previously existed. Many an
tebellum judicial opinions failed to distinguish between enumerated
and unenumerated rights.209 The Marshall Court relied on both
natural law and the Contracts Clause in Fletcher v. Peck .2 0 Federaljus-
tices as late as 1862 insisted that both federal and state officials were
obligated to respect the "obligation of contract," even though the
constitutional text explicitly limits only state power. Justice Nathan
Clifford in Rice v. Railroad Co. asserted, "if the legal effect of the act of
Congress" at issue "was to grant to the Territory a beneficial interest
in the lands [in dispute], then it is equally clear that it was not com-
petent for Congress to pass the repealing act, and divest the title."2"
No enumerated right was cited as supporting this proposition. Justice
Nelson's dissent similarly disdained text as the primary source for
fundamental freedoms. After citing Fletcher for the proposition that
205 See id. ("If it had been intended to leave it to the discretion of the legislature... it cer-
tainly would have been useless to have proceeded further than to have defined the judicial
power, and the tribunals in which it should be vested.").
W6 See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
207 James M. O'Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN. L. REv. 219, 259 (1992).
208 See Mark A. Graber, Establishing Judicial Review: Marbury and the Judiciary Act of 1789, 38
TULSA L. REv. 609, 626-27 (2003) (discussing precedent before Marbury consistent with the Su-
preme Court's power to declare federal and state laws unconstitutional).
209 See Sherry, supra note 49, at 1167-76 (discussing antebellum opinions that failed to distin-
guish between enumerated and unenumerated rights).
210 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810); see id. at 143 (Johnson, J., concurring) (relying upon
natural law as a legal justification).
211 66 U.S. (1 Black) 358, 374 (1861).
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"[i]t is well settled in this court that grants [of land], when made by
the Legislature of a State cannot be recalled," Nelson asserted, "we do
not perceive any reason why the inviolability of the same class of
grants should be less when made by the legislative power of the Gen-
eral Government."
212
Enumeration became the central constitutional strategy for pro-
tecting fundamental rights only after the Civil War. An alliance of
powerful lawyers and Republican party officials successfully promoted
federal courts as the institution primarily responsible for enforcing
constitutional limits on government power.213 Their efforts revived
both the Marbury precedent2 14 and the textualist logic underlying
Marbury. In opinions citing Marbury, late-nineteenth-century Justices
asked, "[o]f what avail are written constitutions whose bills of right
for the security of individual liberty have been written.... if their
limitations and restraints upon power may be overpassed with impu-
nity."215 The first Justice Harlan quoted Marbury at length when as-
serting judicial power, declaring, "[t]o what purpose.., are powers
limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing,
if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be re-
strained? ''216 When Thomas Cooley expressed his "full sympathy with
all those restraints which the caution of the fathers has imposed upon
the exercise of the powers of government," he was referring to enu-
merated powers and enumerated rights, and not to a political process
thought to provide governing officials with sufficient incentives to
pursue the general welfare.1 7 Rights, conservative commentators in-
sisted, were better secured by legal interpretation than by constitu-
tional politics. The "domain of individual liberty," John W. Burgess
stated, was "protected by an independent unpolitical department,,
21 8
212 Id. at 382-83 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
213 See generally Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agen-
das: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511, 511 (2002) (demon-
strating "that the increased power, jurisdiction, and conservatism of federal courts during this
period was a by-product of Republican Party efforts to promote and entrench a policy of eco-
nomic nationalism during a time when that agenda was vulnerable to electoral politics").
214 ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 120 (1989) (explain-
ing that Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887), cited Marbury for the first time for the
proposition that courts could "enforce constitutional limitations on legislative bodies").
215 Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 291 (1884). For the reference to Marbuly, see id.
at 298.
216 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (quoting Marbury).
217 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION, at iv (Little, Brown, &
Co. 1868).
218 John W. Burgess, The Ideal of the American Commonwealth, 10 POL. SCI. Q. 404, 422 (1895).
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and not, as the Framers had thought, by political institutions de-
signed to privilege fundamental freedoms.
During the second half of the twentieth century, a new generation
of liberal scholars and judicial activists articulated the same cate-
chism, although frequently on behalf of a different set of rights than
those previously championed by conservative proponents of judicial
power. Justice Hugo Black, in particular, celebrated judicial protec-
tion of enumerated rights as the near exclusive constitutional strategy
for protecting fundamental freedoms. "To hold that this Court can
determine what, if any, provisions of the Bill of Rights will be en-
forced, and if so to what degree," he asserted in Adamson v. California,
"is to frustrate the great design of a written Constitution."2 1 9 Black in
Reid v. Covert declared, "[t]he fights and liberties which citizens of
our country enjoy are not protected by custom and tradition alone,
they have been jealously preserved from the encroachments of Gov-
ernment by express provisions of our written Constitution., 220 The
same textualist logic that committed Black to protecting all liberties
enumerated by the written Constitution led him to reject vehemently
the notion of judicial protection for unenumerated constitutional
rights. His dissent in Griswold v. Connecticut legitimated judicial power
when "courts proceeding within clearly marked constitutional
boundaries seek to execute policies written into the Constitution,"
but not when "they roam at will in the limitless area of their own be-
liefs as to reasonableness and actually select policies. 221
Two strategies were open for those who rejected Justice Black's
constitutional vision. The first, championed by Thomas Grey and
Suzanna Sherry, insisted that not all fundamental constitutional free-
doms were enumerated. Grey endorsed "the courts' additional role
as expounder of basic national ideals of individual liberty and fair
treatment, even when the content of these ideals is not expressed as a
matter of positive law in the written Constitution., 222 "The Framers,"
Sherry agreed, "intended courts to look outside the Constitution in
determining the validity of certain governmental actions, specifically
those affecting the fundamental rights of individuals., 2 3 The second,
championed by Ronald Dworkin, insisted that what Grey and Sherry
regarded as unenumerated rights were, in fact, legitimate interpreta-
219 332 U.S. 47, 89 (1947) (Black,J, dissenting).
20 354 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1957).
221 381 U.S. 479, 525-26 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting Adamson, 332 U.S. at 90-92
(BlackJ., dissenting)).
M Grey, supra note 2, at 706.
23 Sherry, supra note 49, at 1127.
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tions of such enumerated rights as due process and equal protection.
"The Bill of Rights," Dworkin has claimed, "consists of broad and ab-
stract principles of political morality, which together encompass, in
exceptionally abstract form, all the dimensions of political morality
that in our political culture can ground an individual constitutional
right." In his view, "[t]he key issue in applying these abstract princi-
ples to particular political controversies is not one of reference but of
interpretation, which is very different."224
Both alternatives disparage the Constitution of 1787. Dworkin's
Constitution is the Constitution of 1791, a constitution that protects
only enumerated rights, however broadly those enumerated rights
are defined. "The right to burn a flag and the right against gender-
discrimination" are constitutional rights, Dworkin asserts, only be-
cause they "are supported by the best interpretation of a more gen-
eral or abstract right that is 'mentioned.' 225 Grey and Sherry's Con-
stitution is the Constitution of 1803, a Constitution whose limits are
expounded primarily by the federal judiciary. The first paragraph of
Grey's seminal article declares, "the most fundamental question we
can ask about our fundamental law" is what "our judges" should do.
Sherry concludes that "[t]he founding generation.., expected the
judiciary to keep legislatures from transgressing the natural rights of
mankind, whether or not those rights found their way into the writ-
ten Constitution. "22' Both positions ignore the original commitment
to protecting fundamental rights by a series of well-designed govern-
ment institutions, one of which, but only one of which, is the Su-
228preme Court of the United States.
The more institutional guarantees for fundamental freedoms un-
derlying the Constitution of 1787 may nevertheless determine what
rights Americans enjoy at the turn of the twenty-first century. Madi-
son understood that the numerous constitutional questions and ques-
tions of constitutional law left undecided by the Framers would be re-
solved by the governing officials who were selected according to the
2 Dworkin, supra note 3, at 387.
25 Id. at 389.
26 Grey, supra note 2, at 703.
27 Sherry, supranote 49, at 1177.
228 For a rare contemporary meditation by a distinguished constitutional theorist on whether
contemporary constitutional institutions are providing governing officials with sufficient incen-
tives to protect fundamental rights, see MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM
THE COURTS 95-128 (1999).
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rules laid down by Articles I, II, and 111.229 These rules privilege some
constitutional visions at the expense of others, although not necessar-
ily the constitutional visions the persons responsible for the Constitu-
tion hoped to privilege. The electoral college and state equality in
the Senate, for example, help explain why the dominant Republican
Party coalition is presently able to champion far more conservative
230positions than those held by the fictitious median national voter.
Howard Gillman correctly points out that the future of enumerated
and unenumerated may well depend as much on the predilections of
the Republican majority, if that majority is able to regroup after the
2006 national elections, as on what was and was not enumerated in
1787, 1791, and 1868.231 Madison would not be troubled knowing
that George Bush and his political allies may not defend those liber-
ties Federalists thought fundamental in 1787. The constitution of
1787 was structured to incorporate progressive understandings of
human flourishing. The real question from the perspective of 1787 is
whether constitutional institutions can still be trusted to generate a
political leadership with the capacity and incentives to pursue the
common good and secure basic human rights.
229 See 8 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 450 (Gailliard Hunt ed., 1908) (anticipating that
"difficulties and differences of opinion" in "expounding terms & phrases necessarily used" in
the Constitution).
20 See generally JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, OFF CENTER: THE REPUBLICAN
REVOLUTION AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2005) (explaining how the Republi-
can Party has promoted more conservative policies than popular majorities favor); SANFORD
LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND
HowWE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006).
231 See Gillman, supra note 57.
